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Policy makers in diﬀerent parts of the world are paying more attention to envi-
ronmental markets (i.e., tradeable emission permits markets) as an alternative to
the traditional command-and-command control approach of setting uniform emis-
sion and technology standards. I extend the basic (perfect information) model of a
permits market to accommodate for practical considerations including regulator’s
asymmetric information on ﬁrms’ costs, uncertainty on beneﬁts from pollution con-
trol, incomplete enforcement, incomplete monitoring of emissions and the possibil-
ity of voluntary participation of non-aﬀected sources. Implications for instrument
design and implementation are provided.
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11 Introduction
Policy makers in diﬀerent parts of the world are paying more attention to environmental
markets (i.e., tradeable emission permits markets) as an alternative to the traditional
command-and-command control approach of setting uniform emission and technology
standards. A notable example is the 1990 U.S. Acid Rain Program that implemented a
nationwide market for electric utilities’ sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions (Schmalensee et
al., 1998; Ellerman et al., 2000). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
emissions trading policy represents another and older attempt to implement environmen-
tal markets to mitigate air pollution problems in urban areas across the country (Hahn,
1989; Foster and Hahn, 1995; Tietenberg, 1985). In addition, a few less developed coun-
tries are also beginning to experiment in diﬀerent forms with emissions trading (World
Bank, 1997; Montero et al., 2003; Stavins, 2003a).
These experiences should not leave the impression that environmental markets have
come anywhere close to replacing the traditional command-and-control approach. More
reason to beleive that permit markets are expected to play an increasing role in the
solution of environmental problems in the future. In this sense, experience with existing
permit markets help understand the importance of practical considerations for the design
and implementation of these markets and for establishing the conditions under which they
are likely to perform better than alternative instruments. My intention in this paper is not
to provide an exhaustive treatment of all practical considerations that may prove relevant,
but only some of those that have caught my attention as I review the performance of
existing permits programs (particularly the Acid Rain Program in the U.S. and the total
suspended particulate program of Santiago), and proposals for implementation of new
ones (particularly carbon trading for dealing with global warming and a comprehensive
permits program for curbing air pollution in Santiago).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I develop a basic model
of pollution control where I illustrate the advantage of permits over alternative instru-
ments such as standards. In Section 3 I extend the basic model to accommodate for
some practical considerations that have proved relevant in the design of permit markets.
They include regulator’s uncertainty on costs and beneﬁts from pollution control, incom-
2plete enforcement, incomplete monitoring of emissions and the possibility of voluntary
participation from sources not originally regulated. Section 4 discusses topics for further
research.
2T h e b a s i c m o d e l
Consider a continuum of ﬁrms of mass 1. In the absence of environmental regulation,
each ﬁrm emits one unit of pollution which can be abated at a cost c.T h e v a l u e o f c,
which is private information, diﬀers across ﬁrms according to the (continuous) density
function g(c) and cumulative density function G(c) deﬁned over the interval [c,c].T h e s e
functions are known by the welfare-maximizing regulator. Although the regulator does
not know the control cost of any particular ﬁrm, he can derive the aggregate abatement
cost curve for the industry, C(q),w h e r e0 ≤ q ≤ 1 is the aggregate quantity of emissions
reduction.1 The regulator also knows that the beneﬁt curve from emissions reduction
in any given period is B(q). As usual, I assume that B0(q) > 0, B00(q) ≤ 0, C0(q) > 0,
C00(q) ≥ 0, B0(0) >C 0(0),a n dB0(q) <C 0(q) for q suﬃciently large.
Letting the regulator’s welfare function be W(q)=B(q)−C(q),t h eﬁrst-best reduc-
tion level q∗ solves B0(q∗)=C0(q∗)=c∗,w h e r eG(c∗)=q∗.I ti sﬁrst-best optimal that
ﬁrms with costs equal or below c∗ be the only ones reducing emissions. To implement
the ﬁrst-best solution the regulator can either set a Pigouvian tax on emissions equal to
τ = c∗ or allocate a total of x =1−q∗ tradeable emission permits (recall that aggregate
counterfactual emissions are equal to 1). If the regulator introduces a tax τ, ﬁrms with
c<τwill reduce emissions while ﬁrms with c>τwill prefer to pay the tax. Thus, when
τ i ss e ta tt h eﬁrst-best level c∗, ﬁrms will have incentives to reduce exactly up to the
ﬁrst-best level q∗.
If, on the other hand, the regulator distributes x permits either for free or through
an auction, the market clearing price will be p = C0(1 − x)=G−1(1 − x).I np a r t i c u l a r ,
if the regulator allocates to each ﬁrm x permits for free, ﬁrms with c>pwill be making
1The aggregate cost curve is C(q)=
R y
c cdG,w h e r ey = G−1(q).N o t et h a tC0(q)=y, C0(0) = c,a n d
C00(q)=1 /g(y).
3no reductions and buying extra permits to cover their emissions while ﬁrms with c<p
will be reducing their emissions and selling all their permits. Thus, when x is set at the
ﬁrst best level 1−q∗, the resulting clearing price will be exactly at the ﬁrst-best level c∗.
In this particular setting in which the regulator knows both the aggregate abatement
cost curve and the beneﬁt curve, he is clearly indiﬀerent as to whether use a price
instrument (taxes) or a quantity instrument (permits) to reach the ﬁrst-best solution.
More generally, he can use either taxes or permits to achieve any emission goal (other
than 1 − q∗) at the lowest cost.
In practice, however, we rarely see regulators using taxes or permits. With a few ex-
ceptions, they almost exclusively rely on the traditional command-and-control approach
of setting (uniform) emission and technology standards. Under this approach, a regulator
with an aggregate emission goal of x would require each ﬁrm to emit no more than x.
Clearly, this approach will result in an ineﬃcient allocation of abatement across ﬁrms
unless they have identical abatement costs (i.e., c = c), which is unlikely. As typically
occurs under standards, high cost ﬁrms are reducing too much while low cost ﬁrms are
reducing too little. Because of this eﬃciency loss, economists have been long arguing for
the wider use of market-based instruments such as permits (Dales, 1968; Montgomery,
1972).
Leaving aside political economy considerations that may help explain the limited use
of market-based instruments,2 in the remaining of the paper I will extend the basic model
to incorporate additional elements that regulators are likely to face in the practical design
and implementation of environmental markets.
3 Extending the basic model
The world of perfect information depicted in the basic model is hard to ﬁnd in practice.
Typically, regulators must design and implement policies in the presence of signiﬁcant
uncertainty about costs and beneﬁts, and sometimes, under imperfect monitoring and
enforcement as well. In what follows I will extend the basic model to account for some
2See Stavins (2003) for political economy.
4of these practical considerations.
My intention is not to provide an exhaustive treatment of all practical considerations
that may prove relevant for the design of permits programs, but only some of those that
have caught my attention as I review the performance of existing permits programs,
particularly the Acid Rain Program in the U.S. (Ellerman et al., 2000) and the TSP
in Santiago (Montero et al., 2002), and proposals for implementation of new ones, par-
ticularly carbon trading for dealing with global warming and a comprehensive permits
program for curbing air pollution in Santiago. In extending the basic model, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the normative implications of these practical considerations
may aﬀect the policy design in various ways that can go from a simple tightening of the
basic design, to a combination of permits with some other instrument (such as taxes or
standards), or yet, to the replacement of permits by an alternative instrument.
3 . 1 I m p e r f e c ti n f o r m a t i o no nc o s t sa n db e n e ﬁts
The basic model indicates that when the regulator has a good idea about the (aggregate)
costs and beneﬁts of pollution control along with perfect monitoring of emissions and
full compliance, he can implement the ﬁrst-best by either using a tax of c∗ or allocating
1 − q∗ permits. Several authors have extended the basic model to the case in which the
regulator knows little about ﬁrms’ costs but can costlessly monitor each ﬁrm’s actual
emissions and enforce compliance. To capture the regulator’s imperfect information on
costs in our model, let his prior belief be c(θ)=c + θ,w h e r eθ is some stochastic term
such that E[θ]=0and E[θ
2] > 0,w h e r eE [·] is the expected value operator. I assume
that θ is common to all individual costs c ∈ [c,c], which produces the desired “parallel”
shift of the aggregate marginal cost curve, C0(q), by the amount θ. In other words,
C0(q,θ)=C0(q)+θ.R e c a l lt h a tc(θ) continues to be ﬁrm’s private information, so the
realization of θ is known by all ﬁrms before they make and implement their compliance
(and production) plans.3
3While it is true that the regulator may (imperfectly) deduce uncertainty with a lag from the aggregate
behavior of ﬁrms, I am assuming that he adheres to the original regulatory design from the beginning
of time. Alternatively, we can say that new sources of cost uncertainty arise continually, so the issue of
5Because the introduction of θ leaves the regulator uncertain about the true aggregate
marginal cost curve, he can no longer implement the ﬁrst-best solution by simply allocat-
ing a certain number of permits. Making use of the revelation principle, Kwerel (1977)
and Dasgupta et al. (1980) show that this information asymmetry does not prevent the
regulator from achieving the ﬁrst-best if he can use non-linear instruments (i.e., transfer
to or from ﬁrms contingent on their cost revelations and emissions).4 Alternatively, the
regulator can achieve the ﬁrst-best by announcing a non-linear tax schedule τ(q) equal
to B0(q),w h e r eq is the aggregate amount of reduction observed ex-post.5
Despite the welfare superiority of these non-linear instruments, experience shows that
regulators always favor simple regulatory designs that can be implemented in practice.6
For this particular reason it remains relevant to understand the implications of imperfect
information on the design of relatively simple instruments such as permits, (linear) taxes
and standards.
While cost uncertainty does not change the welfare advantage of permits over stan-
dards, in a seminal paper Weitzman (1974) showed that it does break the welfare equiva-
lence between permits and taxes. To expand the basic model in a tractable way let follow
Weitzman (1974) and Baumol and Oates (1988) and consider linear approximations for
the marginal beneﬁt and cost curves and additive uncertainty. I will also allow here the








where b ≡ B0(0) >c≥ 0, B00 < 0,a n dC00 ≡ c − c > 0 are all ﬁxed coeﬃcients.7 To
capture the regulator’s uncertainty about the true shape of these curves at the time of
uncertainty is never resolved.
4In a later paper Spulber (1988) argues that the ﬁrst-best may not be feasible under budget con-
straints.
5Note that with this tax scheme the regulator is making ﬁrms face the demand curve for emission
reductions.
6This comment applies to the regulation public utilities as well (Rogerson, 2003).
7Note ﬁrst that the linear marginal cost curve results simply from a uniform distribution for g(c).
Further, the notation b is meant to be consistent with c in the cost curve.
6regulatory design and implementation, let his prior belief for the marginal-beneﬁtc u r v e
be B0(q,η)=B0(q)+η,w h e r eη is a stochastic term such that E[η]=0and E[η2] > 0.
For the marginal-cost curve, let the regulator’s prior belief be as above, i.e., c(θ)=c+θ.
It is not diﬃcult to show that the optimal tax and permits design are as in the
certainty case, that is τ = c∗ and x =1− q∗. Because of uncertainty, however, neither
design will be optimal ex-post (unless θ = η =0 ). The relevant policy question then is
which instrument is expected to come closer to the ex-post optimum. To explore this
question we estimate the diﬀerence between the expected social welfare under the price
instrument (taxes) and that under the quantity instrument (permits), which is given by
∆pq ≡ E[W(τ,θ,η) − W(x,θ,η)] (3)
where τ = c∗ and x =1− q∗ are, respectively, the optimal price and quantity designs.
The normative implication of (3) is that if ∆pq > 0, prices (i.e., taxes) provide higher
expected welfare than quantities, and accordingly, ought to be preferred. If ∆pq < 0,
quantities (i.e., tradeable permits) ought to be preferred.
Expression (3) can be conveniently rewritten as
∆pq = E[{B(q(τ,θ),η) − B(q(x,θ),η)} − {C(q(τ,θ)) − C(q(x,θ))}] (4)
The ﬁr s tc u r l yb r a c k e to ft h er i g h th a n ds i d eo f( 4 )i st h ed i ﬀerence in beneﬁts provided
by the two instruments, whereas the second curly bracket is the diﬀerence in abatement
costs. Using the linear approximations above, replacing τ = c∗ and x =1− q∗,t a k i n g








where the ﬁr s tt e r mo ft h er i g h th a n ds i d ei st h ed i ﬀerence in expected beneﬁts (negative)
and the second term is the diﬀerence in expected costs (positive). While taxes lead
to lower expected costs permits lead to higher expected beneﬁts (i.e., lower expected







7which is Weitzman’s well known result.
The normative implications of (6) are quite clear: prices (i.e., taxes) ought to be
preferred if the marginal cost curve is steeper than the marginal beneﬁtc u r v e ;t h a ti s ,
if C00 > |B00|; otherwise quantities (i.e., permits) ought to be preferred. The rationale
for using prices over quantities is the following. As long as miscalculating the ex-post
optimum amount of control has lower welfare consequences than miscalculating the ex-
post optimum (marginal) cost of control, which happens when the marginal cost curve
is steeper than the marginal beneﬁt curve, prices are preferred. In a quantity regime,
t h ea m o u n to fc o n t r o lr e m a i n sﬁxed while the cost of control is subject to large swings
because of uncertainty. If the marginal cost curve is very steep, the (marginal) cost of
control can deviate signiﬁcantly from the ex-post optimum; situation in which a price
instrument that ﬁxes the marginal cost of control turns more appropriate. Note that
beneﬁt uncertainty is absent unless there is some correlation between θ and η.8
Because neither permits nor taxes are ex-post optimum, there seems to be room for
a hybrid policy to improve upon either single-instrument policy. Roberts and Spence
(1980) formally showed that a hybrid policy that combines x =1− q∗ permits with a
tax τ>c ∗ and subsidy s<c ∗ is always superior to either single-instrument policy.9 If,
for example costs happen to be higher than expected, i.e., θ>0, the allocation of 1−q∗
permits appear too tight ex-post resulting in too high prices. The introduction of the tax
puts a ceiling on the permits price, which is equivalent as to having the regulator issuing
additional permits. If, on the other hand, costs happen to be lower than expected, i.e.,
θ<0, the allocation of 1 − q∗ permits appear too lenient ex-post resulting in too low
prices. The introduction of the subsidy puts a ﬂoor on permits prices, which is equivalent
as to having the regulator buying-back some permits.10
The idea of combining permits with taxes (but less with subsidies) is at the center
of the debate on instrument design for reducing carbon dioxide emissions believed to be
8In fact, if θ and η are positively correlated, i.e., E[θη] > 0, an additional negative terms enters into
(5) increasing the advantage of permits over taxes.
9In a subsidy scheme, the government pays ﬁrms for reductions.
10Note that if there are only two possible realizations of cost (high and low), the introduction of a tax
and subsidy implement the ﬁrst best.
8responsible for global warming. Early proposals had permits as the only single instru-
ment to reduce these emissions (see, e.g., Kyoto Protocol), but because several studies
have shown compliance costs to be quite uncertain, more recent proposals argue for the
inclusion of a tax as a safety valve in case the price of permits climbs ineﬃciently high
(Pizer, 2002).
3.2 Incomplete enforcement
It is well known that regulations are not always fully enforced; the TSP program in
Santiago is a good example of that. To understand the implications of incomplete en-
forcement on policy design, in Montero (2002) I extend Weitzman (1974) analysis.11 The
regulator is responsible for ensuring individual ﬁrms’ compliance with either the price or
the quantity instrument. Firms are required to monitor their own emissions and submit
a compliance status report to the regulator. Emissions are not observed by the regulator
except during costly inspection visits, when they can be measured accurately. Thus,
some ﬁrms may have an incentive to report themselves as being in compliance when, in
reality, they are not.
The cost of each inspection is v, which I assume to be large enough that full com-
pliance is not socially optimal (Becker, 1968).12 Therefore, in order to verify reports’
truthfulness, the regulator randomly inspects those ﬁrms reporting compliance through
pollution reduction to monitor their emissions (or check their abatement equipment).
Each ﬁrm reporting compliance faces a probability φ of being inspected. Firms found to
be in disagreement with their reports are levied a ﬁne F (≤ F,w h e r eF is the maximum
feasible ﬁne, which value is beyond the control of the regulator) and brought under com-
pliance in the next period.13 To come under compliance, ﬁrms can reduce pollution or,
depending on the regulatory regime, either pay taxes or buy permits. Firms reporting
11Stralund and Chavez (2000) also study the eﬀects of incomplete enforcement on permits programs.
12Alternatively, we can simply say that the regulator lacks suﬃcient resources to induce full compliance.
13To make sure that a non-compliant ﬁrm found submitting a false report is in compliance during
the next period (but not necesarily the period after), we can assume that the regulator always inspects
the ﬁrm during that next period, and in the case the ﬁrm is found to be out of compliance again, the
regulator raises the penalty to something much more severe.
9noncompliance face the same treatment, so it is always in a ﬁrm’s best economic interests
to report compliance, even if that is not the case.14 Finally, I assume that the regulator
does not alter its policy of random inspections in response to information acquired about
ﬁrms’ type, so each ﬁrm submitting a compliance report faces a constant probability φ
of being inspected.15
After deriving the optimal price and quantity design under uncertainty and incomplete
enforcement,16 the Weitzman comparison between prices (i.e., taxes) and quantities (i.e.,
permits) shown in (5) changes to







where the ﬁrst term of the right hand side is the diﬀerence in expected beneﬁts and the




2(C00)2 ((2 − γ)B
00 + C
00) (8)
where γ = φ/(1 + φ) < 1 is the fraction of the non-compliant ﬁrms (i.e., all those
ﬁrms that have incentives to submit false reports) that are in compliance in any given
period. Since 2−γ>1, eq. (8) shows that incomplete enforcement improves the relative
advantage of permits over taxes
To explain this result requires ﬁrst to understand that the presence of incomplete
enforcement makes the eﬀective (or observed) amount of control under a quantity instru-
ment no longer ﬁxed, as in a permits program with full compliance. Instead, it adapts to
the actual cost of control. Indeed, if the marginal cost curve proves to be higher than ex-
pected by the regulator, more ﬁrms would choose not to comply, and consequently, both
the eﬀective amount of control and the cost of control would be lower than expected.
14Noncompliance and truth-telling could be a feasible strategy if ﬁrms reporting noncompliance were
subject to a ﬁne lower than F. See Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Livernois and McKenna (1999) for
details.
15As game theoretic models of incomplete enforcement have shown (for example, Harrington, 1988), the
regulator clearly can improve upon a uniform inspection probability after learning (maybe imperfectly)
about ﬁrms’ type. But because the amount of control would still be depending on the actual control
costs, the main result of the present paper would not change.
16Optimal designs include also values for φ and F. On this latter, it is optimal for the regulator to
impose the largest feasible ﬁne, that is F. See Montero (2002) for more.
10T h ef a c tt h a tt h ee ﬀective reduction now becomes uncertain has two eﬀects on the
welfare comparison between prices and quantities that can be explained using (7). The
ﬁrst eﬀect is captured in the ﬁrst-term of the right hand side, which shows that the
a d v a n t a g eo fq u a n t i t i e so v e rp r i c e so nt h eb e n e ﬁts i d ei sr e d u c e dt oγ(2−γ) < 1 relative
to the case of full compliance (i.e., γ =1 ).17 The second eﬀect is captured in the second-
term of the right hand side of (7) that shows that the advantage of prices over quantities
o nt h ec o s ts i d ei sa l s or e d u c e dt oγ<1. Because γ(2 − γ) >γ , the second eﬀect
dominates and the overall advantage of prices over quantities is reduced. From (7) one
also observes that incomplete enforcement makes both the marginal beneﬁt curve and the
marginal cost curve to look ﬂatter, but because γ(2−γ) >γ , it makes the marginal cost
c u r v ee v e nm o r es o .I na d d i t i o n ,n o t et h a ta sγ falls, the welfare diﬀerence between the
two instrument shrinks and disappears when there is no compliance at all (i.e., γ =0 ).
Another way to interpret this result is that incomplete enforcement “softens” the
quantity regime, making it resemble a non-linear instrument, as in Roberts and Spence
(1976). Indeed, when costs prove to be higher than expected, some ﬁrms choose not to
comply, increasing the eﬀective amount of pollution.
3.3 Multipollutant markets
In dealing with Santiago air pollution, or more generally, in any urban pollution control
eﬀort, the design and implementation of good environmental policy necessarily involves
more than one pollutant. Hence, the study of permit programs to simultaneously regu-
late various pollutants becomes very relevant. If the regulator has perfect information
about costs and beneﬁts of pollution control for each of the pollutants involved, it is
evident that the regulator can implement the ﬁrst-best through the allocation of permits
to the diﬀerent markets without the need for interpollutant trading. Under imperfect
i n f o r m a t i o no nc o s t sa n db e n e ﬁts and possibly partial compliance, in Montero (2001) I
show that the optimal permits design is more involved. It may be (second-best) optimal,
under some conditions, to have the diﬀerent pollutant markets integrated through some
optimal exchange rates. In practical terms, it may be optimal allowing ﬁrms to cover
17From the concavity of the beneﬁt curve, uncertainty in the reduction level reduces expected beneﬁts.
11their emissions of particulate matter (PM10) with permits of nitrogen oxides (NOx).
Obviously some exchange rate must be deﬁned.
To study under what conditions market integration is beneﬁcial, I use the Weitzman
framework and compare welfare under market integration vs. welfare under market
separation. I consider two pollutants 1 and 2 (e.g., PM10 and NOx). If I impose some
symmetry to the problem, that is B00
1 = B00
2 = B00, C00
1 = C00
2 = C00, φ1 = φ2,a n dθ1 and
θ2 are i.i.d. and not correlated with η (the intercepts c and b and penalty fee F can vary
across markets), the optimal amount of permits to be distributed under integration is
the same that under separation. In addition, it is possible to establish that the welfare





2(C00)2 ((2 − γ)B
00 + C
00) (9)
where γ = φ/(1+φ) < 1 is again the fraction of non-compliant ﬁrms that are in compli-
ance in any given period, E[θ
2] captures regulator’s uncertainty, B00 < 0 is the slope of
the marginal beneﬁtc u r v e sa n dC00 > 0 is the slope of the marginal cost curves.
The ﬁrst in eq. (9) is that under full enforcement (γ =1 ) the regulator should
allow interpollutant trading (i.e., market integration) as long as the marginal cost curves
are steeper than the marginal beneﬁt curves. This result is analogous to the result
obtained by Weitzman (1974), a similar rationale applies to our multipollutant markets
story. Interpollutant trading provides more ﬂexibility to ﬁrms in case costs are higher
than expected, but at the same time, it makes the amount of control in each market
more uncertain. Then, if the marginal cost curves are steeper than the marginal beneﬁt
curves, the regulator should pay more attention to cost of control rather than the amount
of control, and therefore, have markets integrated. On the other hand, if the marginal
beneﬁt curves are steeper than the marginal cost curves, the regulator should pay more
attention to the amount of control in each market, and therefore, have markets separated.
The presence of incomplete enforcement (γ<1)h a si m p o r t a n te ﬀects on the multipol-
lutant markets design as well. Since 2−γ>1, (9) indicates that incomplete enforcement
reduces the advantage of market integration: the regulator should allow interpollutant
trading only if the marginal cost curves are 2−γ times steeper than the marginal beneﬁt
12curves.
3.4 Voluntary participation
For either practical or political reasons, phase-in or less than fully comprehensive trade-
able permit programs with voluntary opt-in possibilities are attracting considerable at-
tention among policy makers. The Acid Rain Program provides a good example. Under
the Substitution provision of this program, electric utility units not originally aﬀected by
the program could voluntarily become subject to all compliance requirements of aﬀected
units and receive SO2 tradeable permits approximately equal to their 1988 emissions
level (7 years before compliance). Another salient example is provided by current emis-
sions trading proposals in dealing with global warming that call for early carbon dioxide
restrictions on OECD countries with (voluntary) substitution possibilities with the rest
of the world. Yet another example is provided by trading proposals in dealing with air
pollution in Santiago that would allow voluntary participation of non-aﬀected sources
(e.g., expansion or creation of parks to sequester PM10)
Although the Substitution provision was primarily designed to allow those non-
aﬀected electric units with low abatement cost to (voluntarily) opt-in, Montero (1999)
explains that a large number of non-aﬀected units opted in because their unrestricted or
counterfactual emissions (i.e., emissions that would have been observed in the absence of
regulation) were below their permit allocations. In other words, they had received excess
permits. While shifting reduction from high-cost aﬀected units to low-cost non-aﬀected
units reduces aggregate compliance costs, excess permits may lead to social losses from
higher emissions than had the voluntary provision not been implemented.
As with any other regulatory practice, the optimal design of a phase-in permits pro-
gram with opt-in possibilities for non-aﬀected ﬁrms is subject to an asymmetric informa-
tion problem in that the regulator has imperfect information on individual unrestricted
emissions and control costs. In world of perfect information (as in the basic model), a
regulator would issue permits to opt-in ﬁrms equal to their counterfactual emissions. In
practice, however, the regulator cannot anticipate the level of counterfactual emissions.
Yet, he must establish a permit allocation rule in advance that cannot be changed easily
13even if new information would suggest so.18
As explained by Montero (2000), in deciding how to set the permits allocation rules
for aﬀected and opt-in ﬁrms, the regulator faces the classical trade-oﬀ in regulatory
economics19 between production eﬃciency (minimization of aggregate control costs) and
information rent extraction ( reduction of excess permits). In fact, a too restrictive
allocation rule for opt-in sources may be eﬀective in controlling the issuance of too many
e x c e s sp e r m i t sb u ta tt h es a m et i m em a yp r o v ei n e ﬀective in attracting low-cost sources.
A more generous allocation rule, on the other hand, may be eﬀective in attracting most
low-cost possibilities but ineﬀective in preventing the issuance of excess permits to opt-in
sources (with both high and low costs).
To study this regulatory problem, in Montero (2000) I extend the basic model in
diﬀerent directions. First, I consider two group of ﬁrms: aﬀected and non-aﬀected ﬁrms.
Second, I let ﬁrm’s unrestricted emissions or counterfactual emissions be u,w h i c ha r e
expected to be equal to historic emissions, that is E[u]=1 .T h e a c t u a l v a l u e o f u,
however, is ﬁrm’s private information which diﬀers across ﬁrms according to some density
function gu(u) and cumulative density function Gu(u) deﬁned over the interval [u,u].
Third, since abatement cost may diﬀe r ,o na v e r a g e ,a c r o s st h et w og r o u p so fﬁrms,20 Il e t
c ∈ [c,c] for aﬀected ﬁrms and c ∈ [c,e c] for non-aﬀected ﬁrms, where e c may be equal to,
higher or lower than c. The regulator’s problem is that of ﬁnding permit allocations for
aﬀected and opt-in ﬁrms that maximizes social welfare subject to imperfect information,
cost and beneﬁt uncertainty and design constraints (for example, the deﬁnition of the
group of ﬁrms is assumed beyond the control of the regulator).
One of the results of Montero (2000) is that if the regulator has two instruments–
the permit allocation to originally aﬀected ﬁrms and to opt-in ﬁrms (those non-aﬀected
ﬁrms that have decided to opt-in)–in the absence of income eﬀects and distributional
18Instead of using an allocation rule, one can work on a case-by-case basis, which most certainly would
make the opt-in process more costly for both the regulator and ﬁrms.
19See Laﬀont and Tirole (1993).
20In the global warming, it is likely that carbon abatement costs of sources aﬀected by the Kyoto
Protocol are, on average, signiﬁcantly higher than the costs of non-aﬀected sources (i.e., less developed
countries).
14concerns, the regulator can achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome. To do so, the regulator sets
the permit allocation of opt-in ﬁrms high enough (i.e., u) such that all non-aﬀected ﬁrms
opt-in. The total excess permits that are expected to be allocated to opt-in sources (i.e.,
u − 1) are deducted from the allocations to aﬀected sources. If the regulator, however,
cannot make “permit transfers” from aﬀected to opt-in sources, so that he has only one
instrument–the permit allocation to opt-in ﬁrms–he achieves a second-best outcome in
which the opt-in allocation is lower than the ﬁrst-best allocation to the point where the
gains from information rent extraction are just oﬀset by the productive eﬃciency losses
of leaving some low-cost non-aﬀected ﬁr m so u t s i d et h ep r o g r a m . 21
3.5 Incomplete monitoring
Most market experiences implemented so far suggest that conventional permits programs
are likely to be used in cases where emissions can be closely monitored, which almost
exclusively occurs in large stationary sources like electric power plants and reﬁneries (e.g.,
Acid Rain Program in the U.S., RECLAIM Program in Southern California). It should
not be surprising then, that environmental authorities continue relying on command-and-
control instruments (i.e., standards) to regulate emissions from smaller sources because
compliance with such instruments only requires the authority to ensure that the regulated
source has installed the required abatement technology or that its emissions per unit of
output are equal or lower than a certain emissions rate standard.
In addition, some regulators view that a permits program where emissions cannot be
closely observed is likely to result in higher emissions than under an alternative standards
regulation because the former provides ﬁrms with more ﬂexibility to choose output and
emissions. As we shall see, this latter concern is entirely valid because there may be cases
in which permits may lead to higher emissions than standards
Thus, it appears that environmental markets are not suitable for eﬀectively reducing
air pollution in cities such as Santiago-Chile or Mexico City where emissions come from
21Montero (2000) also ﬁnd that the second-best result is sensitive to uncertainty in beneﬁts and
aggregate control cost. In fact, if beneﬁt and cost uncertainties are correlated negatively or not at all,
the regulator beneﬁts from setting the opt-in rule slightly above the “certain” second-best allocation.
15many small (stationary and mobile) sources rather than a few large stationary sources.
Rather than disregard environmental markets as a policy tool, I think the challenge
faced by policy makers in cities suﬀering similar air quality problems is when and how
to implement these markets using monitoring procedures that are similar to those under
CAC regulation.
While the literature provides little guidance on how to approach this challenge,22 it
is interesting to observe that despite its incomplete information on each source’s actual
emissions, Santiago-Chile’s environmental agency has already implemented a market to
control total suspended particulate (TSP) emissions from a group of about 600 stationary
sources (Montero et al., 2002). Based on estimates from annual inspection for technol-
ogy parameters such as source’s size and fuel type, Santiago’s environmental regulator
approximates each source’s actual emissions by the maximum amount of emissions that
the source could potentially emit in a given year.23
I believe that a close (theoretical and empirical) examination of this “quasi-emissions”
permit program represents a unique case study of issues of instrument choice and design
that can arise in the practical implementation of environmental markets in which reg-
ulators face important information asymmetries and have a limited number of policy
instruments.
To explore the implications of imperfect monitoring on the design of a permits pro-
gram and on whether permits program should still be preferred to the conventional
standards regulation, in a recent paper I extend the basic model in diﬀerent directions.
Maintaining the notation in Montero (2003), I consider a competitive market for an
homogeneous good supplied by a continuum of ﬁr m so fm a s s1 .
Each ﬁrm produces output q and emissions e of a (uniform ﬂow) pollutant. When
the ﬁrm does not utilize any pollution abatement device e = q. Market inverse demand
22In his survey, Lewis (1996) only brieﬂy mentions the implications of imperfect monitoring on instru-
ment design.
23As it turns out, using the source’s maximum emissions as a proxy does not prevent any adverse eﬀects
that the use of permits (instead of CAC regulation) could eventually have on aggregate emissions. The
choice of proxy is an arbitrary matter because the number of permits being allocated can always be
adjusted accordingly with no eﬃciency eﬀects.
16is given by P = P(Q),w h e r eQ is total output and P0(Q) ≤ 0. Total damage from
pollution is given by D(E),w h e r eE are total emissions and D0(E) > 0. Functions P(Q)
and D(E) a r ek n o w nt ot h er e g u l a t o r .
A ﬁrm can abate pollution at a positive cost by installing technology x,w h i c hr e d u c e s
emissions from q to e =( 1− x)q. Hence, the ﬁrm’s emission rate is e/q =1− x.E a c h
ﬁrm is represented by a pair of cost parameters (β,γ).Aﬁrm of type (β,γ) has a cost
function C(q,x,β,γ) where β and γ are ﬁrm’s private information. To keep the model
mathematically tractable, I assume that the cost function has the following quadratic









2 + γx+ vxq (10)
where c, k and v are known parameters common to all ﬁrms and c>0, k>0, Λ ≡
ck − v2 > 0 and v T 0.25
Function (10) incorporates two key cost parameters that are essential to model ﬁrms’
behavior under permits and standards regulation. One of these cost parameters is the
correlation between β and γ (denoted by ρ), which captures whether ﬁrms with higher
output ex-ante (i.e., before the regulation) are more or less likely to install more abate-
ment x. The other cost parameter is v, which captures the eﬀect of abatement on output
ex-post (note that we have constrained v to be the same for all ﬁrms, thus, a negative
value of v would indicate that, on average, the larger the x the larger the increase in q
ex-post).26 As we shall see, the values of the cost parameters v and ρ play a fundamen-
tal role in the design and choice of policy instruments when emissions are not closely
monitored.
Although the regulator does not observe ﬁrms’ individual values for β and γ,w e
24This is the quadratic approach introduced ﬁrst by Weitzman (1974).
25The parameter v can be negative, for example, if switching to a cleaner fuel saves on fuel costs but
involves such a large retroﬁtting cost (i.e., high k)t h a tn oﬁrm switches to the cleaner and cheaper fuel
unless regulated.
26Ideally, one would like a richer model in which v = δ can vary across ﬁrms, where δ>0 is the ﬁrm’s
private information drawn over some known interval [δ,δ] and according to some known cumulative
distribution. Then, a positive correlation between γ and δ would produce that a higher x leads to an
ex-post higher q. Solving that model, however, requires numerical techniques.
17assume that he knows that they are distributed according to the cumulative joint distri-
bution F(β,γ) on β ∈ [β,β] and γ ∈ [γ,γ].27 To simplify notation further and without
any loss of generality I let E[β]= E[γ]=0 . I also use the following notation: Var[β] ≡ σ2
β,
Var[γ] ≡ σ2
γ,C o v [β,γ] ≡ ρσβσγ and Fβγ ≡ ∂2F(β,γ)/∂β∂γ.
Firms behave competitively, taking the output clearing price P as given. Hence, in
the absence of any environmental regulation, each ﬁrm will produce to the point where
its marginal production cost equals the product price (i.e., Cq(q,x,β,γ)=P), and install
no abatement technology (i.e., x =0 ). Because production involves some pollution, this
market equilibrium is not socially optimal. The regulator’s problem is then to design a
regulation that maximizes social welfare.



















is total emissions. In this welfare function, the regulator does not diﬀerentiate between
consumer and producer surplus and transfers from or to ﬁrms are lump-sum transfers
between consumers and ﬁrms with no welfare eﬀects.
We have explained that information asymmetries regarding costs may not prevent
the regulator from attaining the ﬁrst-best resource allocation if he can costlessly monitor
each ﬁrm’s actual emissions e (Kwerel, 1977; Dasgupta et al.,1980; Spulber, 1988; Lewis,
1996). We are also interested in the problem in which the regulator cannot perfectly
observe ﬁrms’ actual emissions e =( 1− x)q ; although he can costlessly monitor ﬁrms’
abatement technologies or emission rates x. As in Santiago’s quasi-emissions trading
program, this information asymmetry will be present when both continuous monitoring
equipment is prohibitively costly and individual output q is not observable. Thus, if the
regulator asks for an output report from the ﬁrm, we anticipate that the ﬁrm would
misreport its output whenever this was to its advantage. In this case, the regulator
cannot implement the social optimum regardless of the information he or she has about
27Note that we can easily add aggregate uncertainty to this formulation by simply letting β
i = β
i +θ
and γi = γi + η,w h e r eθ and η are random variables common to all ﬁrms.
18ﬁrm’s costs.28
Even if the regulator has perfect knowledge of ﬁrm’s costs and, therefore, can ex-post
deduce ﬁr m ’ so u t p u tb a s e do nt h i si n f o r m a t i o na n dt h eo b s e r v a t i o no fx, the fact that
he cannot make the policy contingent on either emissions or output prevents him from
implementing the ﬁrst-best. In other words, the regulator cannot induce the optimal
amounts of output and emissions with only one instrument (i.e., x).29 Consequently, the
regulator must necessarily content himself with “second-best” policies.
Rather than considering a full range of policies, in what follows I will concentrate
on the eﬀect of imperfect monitoring on the design of simpler policies such as standards
and permits (taxes are equivalent to permits unless we introduce aggregate uncertainty;
see footnote above). Under standards regulation, the regulator’s problem is to ﬁnd the
emission rate standard xs to be required to all ﬁrms that maximizes social welfare W(·)
(subscript “s” denotes standards policy and subscript ”p” denotes permits policy).
On the other hand, under the permits policy, the regulator’s problem is to ﬁnd the
total number of (quasi-emission) permits e e0 to be distributed among ﬁrms that maximizes
social welfare. If we denote by R the equilibrium price of permits,30 the regulator knows
that ﬁrm (β,γ) will take R as given and solve
max
q,x π(q,x,β,γ)=Pq− C(q,x,β,γ) − R · (e e − e e0)
where e e =( 1−x)e q are ﬁrm’s quasi-emissions and e q is some arbitrarily output or capacity
level that is common to all ﬁr m s( t h ee x a c tv a l u eo fe q turns out to be irrelevant because
28Consider the extreme situation in which regulator knows both β and γ. His optimal policy will be
some function T(x;β,γ) in the form of either a transfer from the ﬁrm or to the ﬁrm. Then, ﬁrm (β,γ)
takes P(Q) and T(x;β,γ) as given and maximizes π(q,x,β,γ)=P(Q)q −C(q,x,β,γ)−T(x;β,γ) with
respect to q and x.I ti sn o td i ﬃcult to see that ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions for q and x will always diﬀer
from (??)a n d( ??) for any function T(x;β,γ).
29See Proposition 2 of Lewis and Sappington (1992) for the same conclusion in a related problem. On
the other hand, since the regulator can have a good idea of total emissions E from air quality measures,
one might argue that Holmström’s (1982) approach to solving moral hazard problems in teams may
apply here as well. However, in our context this approach is unfeasible because the large number of
agents would require too big transfers; either from ﬁrms as penalties or to ﬁr m sa ss u b s i d i e s .
30Note that under a tax policy, the optimal price R will be the quasi-emissions tax. If we add aggregate
uncertainty to the model, both policies will not be equivalent from an eﬃciency standpoint.
19it simply works as a scaling factor).
Assuming that P(Q)=P and D(E)=hE, the welfare advantage of the optimal






[{C(qs,x s) − C(qp,x p)} + {(1 − xs)qs − (1 − xp)qp}h]Fβγdγdβ (12)
Recalling that e =( 1− x)q,t h eﬁrst curly bracket of the right hand side of (12) is
the diﬀerence in costs between the two policies, whereas the second curly bracket is the
diﬀerence in emissions that multiplied by h gives the diﬀerence in pollution damages.
After some algebra (12) becomes
∆ps =
v2σ2
















γ + A3ρσβσγ (14)
where A1 =( v2Λ−2ckhv)/2cΛ2, A2 =( cΛ−2chv)/2Λ2 and A3 =( ckh+hv2−vΛ)/Λ2 > 0.
Note that A1, A2 and ρ can be either positive, negative or zero,31 so the magnitude of
∆ps depends on the value of the diﬀerent parameters of the model.
The ambiguous sign of (14) is due to an inevitable trade-oﬀ between ﬂexibility and
potential higher emissions that a regulator will face when implementing a permits pro-
gram under imperfect monitoring. Expression (13) illustrates this trade-oﬀ more clearly.
The ﬁrst term is the diﬀerence in costs between the two policies. Since −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
this term is always positive which indicates that the optimal permits policy is always less
costly than the optimal standards policy. The second term is the diﬀerence in damages,
which can either be positive, negative or zero depending on the value of the diﬀerent
parameters of the cost function. Hence, a quasi-emissions permits policy will always lead
to cost savings but it can also lead to higher emissions.
While the actual magnitude of ∆ps will depend on the value of the diﬀerent parameters
of the model, its sign is governed by the key cost parameters v and ρ.F o re x a m p l e ,t h e
permits policy will be unambiguously superior when v<0 and ρ>0.T h i si ss ob e c a u s e
31Recall that for interior solutions in all cases we must have ck > (h − v)2, ck > v2,a n dh>v .
20when v<0, ﬁr m sd o i n gm o r ea b a t e m e n ta r ea tt h es a m et i m ei n c r e a s i n go u t p u tr e l a t i v e
to other ﬁrms. Similarly, when there is a positive correlation between abatement and
production costs (i.e., ρ>0), larger ﬁrms are more likely to do more abatement.
Contrary to what occur when emissions are perfectly monitored, these results indicate
that neither permits nor standards is the appropriate policy choice in all cases. Because of
this ambiguity, there seems to be room for a hybrid policy to improve upon either single-
instrument policy. Since permits are always superior in terms of costs but standards are
not always superior in terms of emissions, it remains to be seen whether and when a
hybrid policy would provide a net welfare gain.
As it turns out, the combination of instruments does not necessarily leads to higher
w e l f a r ei nt h i sm o d e l .T h ee x a c ts h a p eo ft h er e g i o ni nw h i c ht h eh y b r i dp o l i c yd o m i n a t e s
either single-instrument policy depends on the parameter values. A simple numerical
exercise may be useful. In Figure 1, line  h=p indicates the combinations of v and ρ for
which the hybrid policy just converges to the permits policy for the following parameters
values: P = k = c =4 , h =2 , β =2 , β = −2, γ =1 , γ = −1.32 The ﬁgure also includes
the line  ∆=0 (i.e., combinations of v and ρ that yield ∆ps =0 )a n dt h el i n e ∆E=0 (i.e.,
combinations of v and ρ for which the permits policy and the standards policy yield
the exact same level of emissions). One can distinguish three regions in the ﬁgure. To
t h el e f to f h=p, there are those combinations for which the hybrid policy coincides with
the permits policy. As the ﬁrst row of Table 1 shows, if v = −0.5 and ρ =0 .6,f o r
example, social net beneﬁts (W) are 33% higher under the permits policy than under the
standards policy. Note also that in some places of this region the hybrid policy does not
improve upon the permits-alone policy despite the fact that emissions are higher than
under a standards-alone policy. The logic behind this result is that the introduction of
some binding standard (in combination with permits) would not only reduce emissions
but also increase production and abatement costs. And in this particular region, the
latter eﬀect dominates.
The second region –between the lines  h=p and  ∆=0– includes all those combinations
32The simulation is carried out with only four type of ﬁrms: (β,γ),(β,γ), (β,γ)a n d( β,γ). Also, the
value of the diﬀerent parameters limit the range of v to [−0.5,0.7].
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Figure 1: Hybrid and single-instrument policies
for which the hybrid policy is superior to the permits-alone policy, which in turn, is
superior to the standards-alone policy. For example, if v =0 .6 and ρ =0 .6,t h ew e l f a r e
gain from implementing the hybrid policy (∆h) is 12.6% of ∆ps, as shown in the second
row of the table. It is interesting to observe that despite welfare may not increase by
much, policy designs are quite diﬀerent (the hybrid policy includes a standard that is
almost half the one in the standards-alone policy; though the equilibrium permit price
do not vary much). Finally, the third region –to the right of  ∆=0– includes those
combinations of v and ρ for which the hybrid policy is welfare superior to the standards-
alone policy, which in turn, is superior to the permits-alone policy. Here, the gain from
implementing the hybrid policy as opposed to the standards-alone policy is substantial,
32.5% of |∆ps|.33
Table 1. Hybrid and single-instrument policies: design and welfare
33Note that despite that σγ =0 .5σβ, there is no region in Figure 1 where the hybrid policy converges
to the standards-alone policy.
22vρ x s Re qx h
s Rhe qh Ws ∆ps ∆h
−0.50 .60 .65 2.08 0 2.08 123.64 41.08 0
0.60 .50 .38 2.07 0.18 1.99 82.04 13.66 1.72
0.7 −0.50 .36 2.10 0.21 1.49 79.74 −6.37 2.07
4 Final remarks
I have extended the basic model of pollution control under perfect information to accom-
modate topics that seem relevant for the design and implementation of environmental
markets in practice. Either for space constraints or limited literature, several topics have
been left out. Let me mention a few. The ﬁrst is whether the initial allocation of permits
makes much diﬀerence on the performance of the market and on overall welfare. A free
allocation of permits may induced too much entry from long-run perspective which does
not happen when they are auctioned oﬀ (Spulber, 1985). In the presence of pre-existing
tax distortion (e.g., labor and capital taxes), a free allocation of permits may also be
welfare inferior to auctioning them oﬀ (Goulder et, al., 1997).
A second important topic that has attracted considerable attention in the global
warming discussion is the eﬀect of regulation on technological change. Market-based
instruments such as permits are taxes are generally believed to provide ﬁrms with more
incentives to innovate and adopt newer technologies than traditional standards regulation
(e.g., Jung et al, 1996). However, such view has been somehow challenged recently (e.g.,
Montero, 2002). More empirical analysis is needed here.
Other topics not covered include the design of permits markets for non-uniformly
mixed pollutants (O’Ryan, 1996), the welfare implications of allowing ﬁrms to trade
permits intertemporally (Ellerman and Montero, 2002), the eﬀect of market power on
instrument design and performance (Hahn, 1984; Liski and Montero, 2003), the welfare
comparison between permits and standards when the regulator cannot set emission tar-
gets optimally (Oates et al, 1989), and the design of permit markets in a few players
context and where emissions (eﬀort) are imperfectly monitored at the individual level
but not at the aggregate level. Further research on this latter topic is particularly rele-
vant if we want to introduce permit markets for water pollution control. The literature
23on moral hazards in teams pioneered by Holmström (1982) should be the starting point.
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